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Abstract 
 
Augmenting consumer welfare was a key justification behind the reform of utilities from 
the 1980s. But, three decades later, evidence is mounting that consumer satisfaction 
with household utilities is quite uneven. Moreover, governments, regulators and 
international organizations are increasingly recognizing that consumers from specific 
socio-economic backgrounds may be less satisfied than those from other backgrounds. 
To attend to this, instances of demand-side regulation have been implemented, but there 
remains a lack of empirical research on the precise links between consumers’ socio-
economic background and their satisfaction. This article contrasts consumers’ stated 
and revealed preferences for three major household utility services (electricity, gas and 
telecommunications, including internet) across twelve European countries. Contrasting 
stated and revealed preferences has been applied to policy on transportation, marketing 
and the environment: this article pioneers the application of this technique to the 
analysis of satisfaction with household utilities across multiple countries. We find 
strong evidence that consumers’ socio-economic category matters: consumers with 
lower levels of education, the elderly and those who are not employed exhibit particular 
expenditure patterns and lower satisfaction levels vis-à-vis some of or all the services 
under analysis. We conclude by highlighting how our findings may be of use to 
regulators in the ongoing quest to improve the quality of utility regulation. 
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1. Introduction 
 
Governments, regulators, firms, consumer associations and international organizations 
are increasingly recognising that not all consumers are equally satisfied with household 
utility services, even after the consolidation of a wave of regulatory reform which began 
in the 1980s (OECD 2010). The core justification behind these reforms was, after all, to 
augment the efficiency of utility provision and pass the benefits to consumers, through 
increasing competition and choice, lowering prices, thus augmenting welfare and 
satisfaction (EC 2004; OECD 2009). Despite policy-makers’ claims, Crew and 
Kleindorfer (2002:8) warned that deregulation was more complex than policy-makers 
surmised, and argued rent-seeking behaviour might lead to “mischief”, whereby the 
redistribution of monopoly rent could allow powerful interests to gain the upper hand 
against consumers. Moreover, recent empirical evidence is suggesting that some 
consumers are less well positioned than others to deal with challenges brought about by 
deregulation (OECD 2008). This paper shows how different levels of consumer 
satisfaction with household utilities may be associated with the socio-economic 
background of consumers. 
 
Mainstream approaches to utility regulation were designed from the supply-side, usually 
taking the form of means-based subsidies or geographical/product redistribution. Fresh 
thinking on regulation is emerging, however, which recognises mainstream approaches 
alone may be inadequate: demand-side regulation is being increasingly introduced as a 
complement to supply-side methods in Europe, North America, Australia, and beyond. 
One important development is that governmental agencies are increasingly using the 
concept of the potentially “vulnerable consumer” to deal with uneven experiences of 
household utility services in new legislation (examples from the UK include the Energy 
Act, passed in 2010 and the 2012 draft Water Bill). While applauding efforts to consider 
potentially vulnerable consumers in utility regulation, consumer associations have 
argued that firms still exercise great discretion in applying social tariffs (for instance, 
some energy providers only target pensioners, whilst their rivals also target lower-
income families). The concern remains that reductions are not always obtained by those 
who most need them (see Consumer Focus 2010). In response, efforts are ongoing to 
clarify and co-ordinate the concept of the potentially vulnerable consumer. It is argued 
this is a multi-dimensional category, which may be subject to the market in question, 
and may not necessarily be captured by means-testing alone (OFGEM 2012; Stern 
2012; European Parliament 2012).  
 
With new thinking on utility regulation ongoing, there remains the major problem of a 
lack of evidence on the precise interrelationship between consumers’ socio-economic 
background and their satisfaction with utility services. The major policy concern 
addressed in this paper is whether consumers from particular socio-economic 
backgrounds are potentially gaining less than others in the current regulatory 
framework. We do so by examining consumers’ socio-economic background and their 
expenditure decisions on, and satisfaction with, three major household utility services 
(electricity, gas and telecommunications, including the internet) across twelve European 
countries. Our approach is to contrast data on consumer satisfaction (Stated Preferences, 
henceforth, SP) with that on actual household expenditure (Revealed Preferences, RP). 
Following Whitehead et al. (2008), combining the analysis of RP and SP has the 
advantage of avoiding the potential weaknesses of using just one source alone, as will 
be explained. The task of peering into the interrelationship between consumers’ socio-
economic characteristics, consumer expenditure decisions and satisfaction requires 
comparable, disaggregated, data on expenditure and satisfaction. In Europe, this data is 
available through European-wide surveys on consumer satisfaction with household 
utilities, published in the Eurobarometer series, and national and European-level 
Household Budget Surveys (HBS), collected by the European Statistical Office, 
EUROSTAT (EUROSTAT 2011). Ideally, consumer satisfaction with and expenditure 
on utilities could be contrasted over time to permit gauging whether evolving utility 
regulation was accompanied by greater satisfaction. Unfortunately, until 2006, survey 
respondents were not asked about their socio-economic background, while non-users 
were screened out of the survey. The 2006 survey (EC 2007) was a break-through in 
that consumer background was disaggregated, whilst non-users’ opinions were included 
in survey results. Whilst the subsequent consumer surveys (EC 2010a, 2011) 
disaggregated consumer background, questions were dropped on access and price 
satisfaction, non-users were again removed from results. This means that, for this 
analysis, the EC (2007) is used as a unique source where consumer satisfaction 
(including non-users) on access and price by socio-economic category can be studied. 
 
We examine three major categories associated with potential consumer vulnerability in 
the literature: age, education and employment status. These categories have been widely 
associated with potential vulnerability because the elderly (and the very young), the 
lesser educated and those without exposure to a work environment may be less 
integrated into knowledge-sharing networks than their peers, and therefore less 
privileged when interpreting the new complex markets surrounding household services, 
as we discuss later. We find strong evidence that socio-economic categories are 
associated with satisfaction patterns. Consumers with lower levels of education are less 
likely to be satisfied with all three services, most sharply, with telecommunications. 
Additionally, those who are not employed and the elderly tend to express less 
satisfaction with telecommunications. On this basis, we suggest a “vicious circle” 
currently exists for some consumers whose socio-economic background may influence 
their expenditure on utility services which, in turn, influences their satisfaction with and 
use of these services. Our results which identify patterns linking satisfaction and socio-
economic background provide an empirical basis upon which future demand-side 
regulation could be designed. Regulation could be established towards a “virtuous 
circle”, whereby not only consumers, but also governments and firms, stand to benefit 
(Faruqui and Sergici 2011). 
 
The rest of the paper is organised as follows. The second section synthetically describes 
the increasing attention paid to the relationship between consumer satisfaction and the 
socio-economic background of consumers in the context of utility reform. The third and 
fourth section respectively describes the data, and derives the hypotheses and presents 
the econometric model. The fifth section discusses the findings. Conclusions highlight 
the key socio-economic variables and related sectors where satisfaction is lower, and 
suggest it is here where regulators could look in their ongoing quest to improve the 
quality of utility regulation.  
 
2. Utilities and Consumer Satisfaction 
 
From the 1980s onwards, utilities around the world were subject to a wave of reform – 
deregulation, competition and privatization (Clifton, Lanthier and Schröter, 2011). 
Reforms were justified on the grounds that they would increase the efficiency of utility 
service provision, principally, through the introduction of competition to activities 
which had previously been organised as a monopoly (EC 2004). In theory, deregulation 
would break up monopoly inefficiency, increase consumer choice and lower product 
prices: it was reasonable to expect consumer satisfaction to increase. Crew and 
Kleindorfer (2002) pointed out that deregulation could lead to the division and 
redistribution of monopoly rent, whereby large consumers with greater market power 
may gain the upper hand against small consumers. 
 
In practise, after an initial period of optimism, policy-makers became concerned that 
utility reform was proving more complex than first thought. Beyond issues related to 
introducing competition to the market, specific problems were noted from the consumer 
perspective related to the growing complexity of utility markets. For instance, 
household billing procedures could be cumbersome and complex: in the UK, mounting 
consumer complaints to energy providers led to the creation of Energywatch in 2000 
with the passage of the Utilities Bill (HMSO 2000). Energywatch then filed a “super 
complaint” to the regulator, Office of the Gas and Electricity Markets (OFGEM), 
accusing firms of obscure and over-complex billing practices. This resulted in the 
introduction of a Billing Code of Practice and the creation of an Ombudsman for energy 
and communications, where similar problems were experienced by consumers (OFGEM 
2005). Other consumer complaints concerned penalties incurred on those wishing to 
switch, which had been obscurely described in the “small print” of the contract. Cold-
calling or door-to-door sales to consumers by rival providers to persuade consumers to 
switch became common. Switching, understood as an essential means of disciplining 
the market, was acknowledged as sometimes being costly from the consumer viewpoint, 
both in terms of actual information gathering and analysis, but also because they 
perceived the costs of change were high (Giulietti et al. 2005). Switching did not always 
lead to welfare maximization, as observed by Wilson and Waddams Price (2010). 
Experimental observations simulating market complexity argued that “choice overload” 
could, paradoxically, lead to lower consumer satisfaction (Iyengar and Lepper 2000; 
Haynes 2009). So, whilst competition meant more market entrants, the new market 
arrangements required clear and accessible communication to consumers to support 
initial and subsequent consumer decisions.  
 
Traditionally, the regulatory regime which guided utility provision was principally 
designed from the supply side. Typically, in the cases of telecommunications and 
energy, policy was justified by the claim it promoted universal provision, through 
geographical or product redistribution, or via means-tested policies (see Kaserman and 
Mayo 1994 for a critique of the effects of cross-subsidization). In addition, some 
governments implemented Light User Schemes, whereby restricted services could be 
bought for reduced fees, and made available for targeted segments of the population, 
such as the very elderly or low-income families. Often, these schemes were ill-designed, 
and ended up having perverse effects. A case in point was the controversy around the 
UK´s former telecommunications incumbent BT which introduced a “social tariff” 
scheme which was offered to residents of modest housing: later, it was found that 40 
percent of consumers who had benefitted from the scheme were second home-owners, 
not the low income (OFCOM 2009).  
 
In recent years, governments and organizations have commenced a search for new 
regulatory approaches to deal with the increased market complexities from the 
viewpoint of the consumer. Between 2008 and 2010, the European Commission (EC) 
organized a series of international conferences on how regulation could be adapted in 
view of the mounting evidence that consumers were only unevenly satisfied with a 
range of services and goods: utilities were at the centre of the debate. Agreement was 
reached among invited representatives from government policy-makers, national 
institutions and international organizations, including the Australian Government, 
(2007), the US Federal Trade Commission (2007), the Institute for Government of the 
UK (2010), the EC (2008, 2010b) and the OECD (2008, 2010) on three major issues. 
Firstly, though utility reform from the 1980s onwards had been partially successful, the 
benefits of reform were not perceived by all consumers evenly. Secondly, new thinking 
was required on how to implement demand-side regulation to target consumers from 
particular socio-economic groups with a view to improving their use of, and satisfaction 
with, utility services. Thirdly, they coincided that Behavioural Economics may provide 
the most useful theoretical base to guide future policy in this field. The fundamental 
tenets of Behavioural Economics, working from the foundations established by 
Neoclassical Economics, are well known, as developed by Daniel Kahneman and 
colleagues. In essence, this school recognises that individuals do not always behave as 
absolute rational and selfish agents, who maximize their own utility when taking 
decisions (Mullainathan and Thaler 2000). Instead, actors suffer psychological biases, 
and take decisions in conditions of “bounded rationality” and “flawed heuristics” 
(Cooper and Kovacic 2012:45). Insights from Behavioural Economics could be applied 
to better understand the circumstances influencing consumers’ decisions in light of the 
emerging consensus that the concept of the potentially vulnerable consumer is multi-
dimensional, and cannot simply be resolved through “means-testing” (Consumer Focus 
2010). If consumers could be helped to become more “active” in different markets, they 
would act as a more positive force to “discipline” the market (Armstrong and 
Sappington 2006). 
 
Insights from Behavioural Economics suggest it is important to identify and understand 
the psychological and economic reasons why people fail to systematically maximize 
utility. Kahneman et al. (1982) stressed that decision-making is based on heuristics 
derived from the environment, which tends to be dominated by uncertainty and 
complexity. Consumers’ social, cultural and economic environment, therefore, may 
influence behaviour, leading to potentially heterogeneous outcomes. So, Behavioural 
Economics could be mobilised to explain why consumers belonging to particular socio-
economic backgrounds could be thought of as potentially vulnerable in the face of 
specific consumption decisions. Potentially “vulnerable consumers” has been usefully 
defined as: those who “are at a disadvantage in exchange relationships where that 
disadvantage is attributable to characteristics that are largely not controllable by them” 
(Andreasen and Manning 1990:13). Vulnerability is not directly observable; rather, it is 
typically associated with particular socio-economic variables which may be 
representative of it. Moreover, consumers are “potentially” vulnerable: “vulnerability” 
is not a permanent, fixed assignation, but may be contingent on the environment. Hence, 
scholars and policy-makers tend to identify socio-economic characteristics which are 
potentially associated with vulnerability. Generally speaking, discussions about 
categories associated with potential vulnerability are quite consistent across the US, 
Europe and beyond, including, in virtually all cases: 1) age (the very elderly/young); 2) 
those on low incomes 3) those who do not work 4) the long-term disabled 5) those with 
lower educational attainments 6) rural dwellers and 7) ethnic minorities (Andreasen and 
Manning 1990; European Parliament 2012). Though Behavioral Economics can be used 
to study how contextual factors may influence any decision-making by any and all 
consumers (Institute for Government 2010), the specific context of the increased 
complexities in utilities markets has led scholars and policy-makers to focus principally 
on age, income, work status, disability and education (Office of Fair Trading 1998; 
OECD 2008).  
 
3. Data and approach 
 
The empirical research is based on the complementary analysis of consumers’ SP and 
RP in regard to electricity, gas and telecommunications services. In a state-of-the-art of 
the field, Whitehead et al., (2008) synthetically explain how combining SP and RP 
analysis helps maximize the respective strengths of each approach, whilst minimizing 
their weaknesses, so enriching data interpretation and the results obtained. This 
approach has been applied across different disciplines, including environmental 
valuation, transport and marketing, but not yet to analyzing utility services across 
multiple countries. By so doing, our aim is to contribute to the ongoing research on how 
to better regulate utilities from the demand side as a complement to traditional supply-
side regulation.  
 
Our analysis follows Kahneman and Thaler’s (2006) description of the decision-making 
process which they divide into two steps: firstly, individuals make choices, reflected in 
RP and, secondly, they obtain a degree of satisfaction, reflected in SP. The socio-
economic background of consumers may influence their experience in confronting 
market complexity, making it more difficult for them than their peers. Regarding SP, we 
assume that an association between expressions of lower satisfaction and a particular 
socio-economic category is a concern. As regards RP, we assume that expenditure on a 
service is derived from a unit price multiplied by a quantity purchased: this can be 
understood both in quantitative terms (the amount of the service purchased) and in 
qualitative terms (the quality of the service purchased). By contrasting SP and RP we 
attempt to interpret this situation by providing three major scenarios: 1) A particular 
group of consumers is associated with lower satisfaction and lower expenditure on a 
service. This could be explained because these consumers purchased a smaller 
amount of that service (for instance, by limiting the number of phone calls) or, because 
they purchased a lower quality service (such as contracting a poorer internet 
connection). So, this group of consumers may have restricted their consumption in this 
market, due to their difficulties with and lower confidence in that market, as expressed 
through their lower levels of satisfaction; 2) A group of consumers is associated with 
lower satisfaction with but higher expenditure on a service. This could be explained if 
these consumers are paying a higher unit price for these services, that is, they took 
poorer consumption decisions, and thus their difficulties are reflected in lower 
satisfaction; 3) A group of consumers is less satisfied than their peers but have similar 
expenditures. This could be because their satisfaction is inconsistent, or, because they 
are paying a higher unit cost whilst restricting their consumption in the market, hence 
the effect on expenditure is ambiguous. Thus, we first analyze SP, to detect which 
socio-economic groups are associated with lower levels of satisfaction, and then we 
analyze RP, to assess whether SP are confirmed through expenditure decisions, and how 
this impacts upon service use. 
 
SP are consumers’ self-assessment of their evaluation of, or satisfaction with, a 
particular product or service. SP allow us to analyze beyond consumers’ observed 
behavior, as they may help shed light on the reasons for their behavior or the results 
they obtain from that behavior. Through stating preferences, individuals evaluate their 
level of subjective wellbeing by comparing this with that of other people, past 
experiences and future expectations (Frey and Stutzer 2002). These authors sustain that 
reported subjective well-being is a valid and empirically adequate measure for human 
wellbeing, which can be modeled in a micro-econometric function using independent 
variables such as individual socio-demographic and socio-economic characteristics as 
possible explanatory factors. Despite this, few attempts have been made to evaluate the 
regulation of utility services using SP (such as Clifton and Díaz-Fuentes, 2010), so little 
is still known about how socio-economic characteristics may influence decision-making 
in this field. 
 
Turning to the data, acknowledging that deregulation could have negative and positive 
consequences was the reason why the EC, under pressure from various actors and 
governments, decided to launch specific European-wide Eurobarometers surveys on 
consumer satisfaction with utilities (Clifton, Comín and Díaz-Fuentes 2005). These 
surveys were published at regular intervals (EC 1997, 2000, 2002, 2003, 2005, 2007, 
2010a, 2011). Unfortunately, because the survey design differs in each case, it is not 
possible to systematically analyze the evolution of satisfaction against regulation. 
Moreover, as mentioned, because EC (2007) is the only survey which disaggregates 
respondents’ socio-economic background and includes the opinion of non-consumers in 
the survey results, it is a unique source of information on the link between satisfaction 
and socio-economic consumer background. For the purposes of this article, the micro-
data of EC (2007) are used. This contains a wealth of information on European 
consumers’ opinions on a range of utilities, including use, accessibility, affordability, 
importance, and so on.  
 
RP provide information on consumers’ observable choices in the market, and are a 
useful complement to SP, as they are commonly understood as constituting more 
objective information. At the national level, governments compile HBS, which include 
information about households’ expenditure broadly disaggregated, as well as the socio-
economic characteristics of the household representative. EUROSTAT collects and 
homogenizes this national data thus generating a European-wide database on a regular 
basis. The most recent Europe-wide HBS corresponds to the period 2004-6 
(EUROSTAT 2011). Unfortunately, this source does not provide individually 
disaggregated information on unit price paid and quantity purchased, so the results 
obtained require interpretation by contrasting those from Eurobarometer, as explained. 
Traditionally, mainstream economics focused on RP. Following Samuelson (1938), the 
economic theory of consumer behavior was based on RP, inferred from consumers’ 
expenditure decisions in the market in response to different price combinations. RP 
reflected in expenditure patterns have been used, in the case of utilities, to evaluate the 
effect of regulatory reform of the British gas market on households with different socio-
economic characteristics (Hancock 1996; Gómez-Lobo 1996) and on internet usage 
according to consumer socio-economic background (Cardona et al. 2009; Glass and 
Stevanova 2010).  
Increasingly, scholars have argued that other approaches should be used as a 
supplement to RP to better understand behavior. Whitehead et al. (2008) synthetically 
reviewed the contribution to research on consumer behavior by combining RP and SP as 
complementary sources. The advantage of RP is that they are based on actual choices 
(expenditure) whilst their disadvantage is that they rely on historical data (behavior in 
response to new policies is non-existent). Meanwhile, the advantage of SP is that 
hypothetical policy scenarios can be tested for (such as non-use values) whilst their 
major disadvantage lies in their advantage; they may be hypothetical so replies may be 
unrealistic (Whitehead et al. 2008; 875).  
Turning to the data, whilst Eurobarometer includes information from 25 European 
countries, the EUROSTAT HBS does not include information on the Czech Republic, 
Italy, Malta, Poland and Portugal, nor does it include sample weights for Cyprus, 
Luxembourg, the Netherlands and Slovenia, whilst its information is incomplete 
regarding the dependent and independent variables required for estimations for Austria, 
Germany, Sweden and the UK. Hence, our final data set is complete for twelve 
countries (over 166 million inhabitants), which are representative of Europe in that they 
include diversity by geographical and socio-political characteristics (Northern, Central, 
Western, Southern and Eastern countries), size (large, medium and small countries) and 
economic development (more and less developed countries). Information on the 
samples is shown in Annex 1.  
Stated use of the utility services is presented in Table 1. As they are based on 
individuals’ judgments, SP are subject to some biases (Frey and Stutzer 2002). Taking 
into account the percentage of bias inherent in SP, we can observe that electricity is 
universally used, whilst gas is not. As regards telephone services, observed separately, 
both fixed and cellular telephony are used broadly, but neither are universally adopted. 
However, when considered together, we can observe that the use of at least one of them 
is universal. This suggests that, for a considerable part of the population, these 
technologies have become substitutable (Briglauer et al. 2011). Finally, the internet has 
not been universally adopted. When both “energy” (electricity and gas), “telephone” 
(fixed and mobile) and “telecommunications” (fixed, mobile and internet) are 
considered at the aggregate level, however, their use is universal.  
As regards stated satisfaction with the price of services, Table 2 organizes total 
consumer price satisfaction according these four service categories: “electricity”, 
“energy” (electricity and gas), “telephone” (fixed and mobile/cellular) and 
“telecommunications” (fixed, mobile and internet). Our analysis uses these categories – 
as opposed to examining all services individually – for two major reasons. Firstly, 
consumers are often obliged to purchase energy or communications “packages” 
(telephone plus internet) and it is often not feasible to contract each service 
independently. Additionally, and, more importantly, some of these individual services 
are not used universally and their use may be influenced by consumers’ socio-economic 
background). The inclusion or exclusion of these consumers who do not use a particular 
individual service (such as fixed phone or the internet) but do use other services in the 
market (that is, telecommunications) would bias the estimators associated with those 
characteristics if each service was analyzed individually.  
The left-hand column one in Table 2 shows the number of services analyzed: under 
electricity, the percentage of consumers who are dissatisfied versus satisfied (67.7%); 
under energy, those satisfied with zero, one or both energy services; under telephone 
those satisfied with zero, one or both fixed and mobile; finally, under 
telecommunications, those satisfied with zero, one, two or all telecommunications 
services (fixed, mobile and internet). Interestingly, price satisfaction with “energy” is 
observed for 40.3% of the population, whilst nearly all those satisfied with the price of 
gas are also satisfied with the price of electricity. Meanwhile, for telecommunications, 
nearly half (48.8%) of consumers are satisfied with both fixed and cellular telephony, 
but this falls to 33.7% when the internet is included. Analysis of the factors 
conditioning these expressions of satisfaction is discussed below. 
 
Table 1. Stated use of energy and telecommunications services in 12 European 
countries in 2006 (EC, 2007) 
    
Stated Use 
(%) 
  Electricity 95.9 
  Gas 53.0 
Energy (Electricity and/or Gas) 96.7 
  Fixed phone 77.7 
  Mobile phone 79.7 
Telephone (Fixed and/or Mobile phone) 97.5 
  Internet 44.5 
Telecommunications 
(Fixed and/or Mobile phone 
and/or Internet) 97.7 
Source: Computed by authors based on EC (2007). 
 
Table 2. Percentage of stated price satisfaction with energy and telecommunications 
services, by number of services with price satisfaction in 2006 (EC, 2007). 
 
N. of services Electricity Energy Telephone Telecommunications 
0 32.3 28.5 21.8 17.5 
1 67.7 31.2 29.4 23.5 
2   40.3 48.8 25.4 
3       33.7 
Source: Computed by authors based on EC (2007). 
 
Expenditure on energy and telecommunications services in the twelve European 
countries represents more than 3.6% and 3.2% of households’ total expenditure 
respectively (EUROSTAT 2011). This attests to the importance these services have in 
overall household expenditure. There are significant disparities between countries, most 
of which are due to political and economic differences, such as the significantly lower 
expenditure in absolute terms generally observed across the three former members of 
the Soviet Union. Another difference across countries is expenditure on gas: though this 
is important in most countries, it is nearly non-existent in others, such as Finland. 
Differences between and within countries are analyzed in the next section. 
 
4. The Empirical model 
To examine possible associations between consumers’ socio-economic background, 
expenditure on and satisfaction with household utilities, the following two hypotheses 
are proposed: 
1. Consumers’ socio-economic characteristics condition their satisfaction as 
regards the price of services. If this is found to be the case, analysis will seek to 
identify which socio-economic characteristics are related to lower satisfaction. 
2. Consumers’ socio-economic characteristics related to lower satisfaction with the 
price of services are also related to their expenditure on services. If this is the 
case, attention will be paid to whether this has negative or positive expenditure 
outcomes. 
With respect to SP, the dependent variable is, for each service category, a categorical 
naturally ordered variable (yi), as described in Table 2, representing the number of 
services within the same category for whose price a particular consumer is satisfied, 
namely, electricity, energy, telephone and telecommunications. We opted to analyze 
each category using the ordered variable (yi), instead of a binary variable (for instance, 
“satisfied with zero services within a category” versus “satisfied with one or more of the 
services”, which would mean loss of important information about satisfaction with an 
intermediate number of services.  
We define each dependent variable, for an m-alternative ordered model, as: 
mjyifjy jiji ,...,1,
*
1 =≤<= − αα  
Where: 
i is a individual consumer. 
m is the number of alternatives in the response, being 3 for energy and telephone 
(satisfaction with 0, 1 or 2 services) and 4 for telecommunications (satisfaction 
with 0, 1, 2 or all 3 services). As explained below, electricity, with only two 
possible responses, is analyzed using a binary probit model. 
 yi* is an unobserved measure of satisfaction, defined as: 
  iii uxy +′= β
*  
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Thus the regression parameters β and the m – 1 threshold parameters α are obtained for 
energy, telephone and telecommunications. These results are included in Annex 2. From 
this model, we estimate the marginal effects of changes in each independent variable xγ 
on the probability of being satisfied with the price of all the services within a category, 
described in Table 3, by the following equation: 
 γ
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 Where j = m. 
In the case of electricity, there are only 2 possible responses: satisfaction with the price, 
1, or not, 0. Thus, Pr(yi = 1) is estimated from a standard binary probit model (results 
are included in Annex 3) of the form: 
 )()1Pr( βii xy ′Φ==  
Where the marginal effects of xγ  on Pr(yi = 1), described in Table 3, are obtained from 
the following equation: 
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As regards RP, the dependent variable is, for each service category, the logarithm of 
households’ expenditure on them, expressed in Euros per year. Each dependent variable 
is analyzed from an OLS equation of the form: 
iii uxEXP +′= β)ln(  
Where: 
EXPi is household i expenditure on a category of services. 
xi is a vector of independent variables for household i. 
The independent variables (x) have been selected following the literature on potentially 
vulnerable consumers as discussed. Of those socio-economic variables associated with 
potentially vulnerable consumers, comparable data available across both the 
Eurobarometer and the HBS includes 1) age 2) employment status and 3) education, 
whilst data is incomplete or not comparable for low income, disabilities, ethnic 
minorities and rural dwellers. Our selection of independent variables thus focuses on 
these three dimensions representative of potential vulnerability: age (the elderly); 
employment (non-employment) and education (basic). In addition, we include control 
variables in order to correct for the most important factors which may influence 
satisfaction with and/or expenditure on utility services: country of residence (capturing 
the effect of each separated market); household size (capturing the effect of the scale on 
consumption); and housing occupancy status (differentiating home-owners from those 
who rent). To analyze RP, we also include household income as a control variable, 
which is particularly relevant as the dependent variable is expressed in monetary terms. 
In the analysis of SP, the three dimensions of consumers’ potential vulnerability led to 
the following independent variables (x): employment, the non-employed (NOOCUP) 
compared with the employed; age, those over 64 and those over 74 (FROM65TO74 and 
MORE74) versus the middle-aged and the young; and education, the lesser-educated 
(EBASIC) versus those with higher education (category of reference). Control variables 
include: the country, France being the category of reference; household size, a two-
person household being the category of reference; and housing occupancy status, 
comparing non-owners (NOHOUSEPR) with owners. We assume a problem exists 
when consumers with a particular socio-economic background are less satisfied than 
their peers. Next, we evaluate if this is also reflected in expenditure patterns and, if so, 
how. 
Regarding RP,  we focus on the same dimensions to represent consumers’ potential 
vulnerability: employment: those households where no members are employed 
(NONEOCUP) versus those with two or more employed members (category of 
reference); the age of the reference person, comparing those over 64 and over 74 (RP 
FROM65TO74 and RP MORE74) versus the middle-aged and the young; and the 
education of the reference person, comparing the lesser-educated (RP EBASIC) with 
those with higher education (category of reference). Control variables include the 
country, with France as the category of reference; household size, by the number of 
household members and this variable squared; housing occupancy status, comparing 
non-owners (NOHOUSEPR) with owners; and the logarithm of a household’s total 
equivalent expenditure, according to the OECD scale (lnSPENDEQ). 
 
5. Estimation results 
Estimations for satisfaction and household expenditure on services are shown in Tables 
3 and 4. Our discussion of the results is organized by considering the three categories 
associated with consumers’ potential vulnerability: educational attainment; employment 
status and age.  
 
Table 3. Marginal effects on satisfaction with the price of all the services 
    Electricity Energy Telephone Telecomm. 
  Variable Marg. Eff. 
Marg. 
Eff. Marg. Eff. Marg. Eff. 
Country BELGIUM 0.112*** 0.172*** 0.201*** 0.169*** 
  (0.018) (0.021) (0.019) (0.020) 
 DENMARK 0.161*** 0.031* 0.258*** 0.229*** 
  (0.017) (0.018) (0.018) (0.020) 
 ESTONIA 0.033 -0.033* 0.052** -0.027 
  (0.021) (0.019) (0.021) (0.018) 
 FINLAND -0.256*** -0.269*** 0.040** 0.034** 
  (0.023) (0.013) (0.019) (0.017) 
 GREECE 0.195*** 0.068*** 0.272*** 0.145*** 
  (0.017) (0.019) (0.019) (0.019) 
 HUNGARY 0.032 0.111*** 0.121*** 0.007 
   (0.021) (0.023) (0.021) (0.018) 
 IRELAND 0.002 -0.051*** 0.155*** 0.043** 
  (0.022) (0.019) (0.021) (0.019) 
 LATVIA 0.066*** 0.050** -0.039* -0.105*** 
  (0.020) (0.020) (0.020) (0.016) 
 LITHUANIA 0.252*** 0.342*** 0.187*** 0.128*** 
  (0.012) (0.018) (0.020) (0.020) 
 SLOVAKIA 0.145*** 0.296*** 0.217*** 0.033* 
  (0.018) (0.022) (0.020) (0.018) 
 SPAIN 0.087*** 0.153*** 0.133*** 0.082*** 
   (0.021) (0.023) (0.023) (0.021) 
Employment NOOCUP -0.017 -0.031* -0.045** -0.045*** 
    (0.018) (0.017) (0.018) (0.015) 
Age LESS35 0.009 0.010 0.046** 0.070*** 
  (0.021) (0.019) (0.021) (0.019) 
 FROM50TO64 -0.016 -0.016 0.003 -0.023 
  (0.023) (0.021) (0.024) (0.019) 
 FROM65TO74 -0.011 -0.019 -0.061** -0.110*** 
  (0.030) (0.028) (0.029) (0.022) 
 MORE74 -0.022 -0.013 -0.109*** -0.147*** 
    (0.035) (0.032) (0.031) (0.021) 
Education EBASIC -0.042* -0.043** -0.098*** -0.125*** 
  (0.021) (0.020) (0.021) (0.016) 
 ESECONDARY -0.035* -0.034** -0.024 -0.055*** 
    (0.019) (0.017) (0.019) (0.016) 
Control ONEPERS -0.019 -0.017 -0.053*** -0.050*** 
variables  (0.021) (0.020) (0.020) (0.016) 
 THREEPERS -0.023 -0.016 0.037 0.051** 
  (0.023) (0.021) (0.023) (0.020) 
 FOURPERS -0.060** -0.025 0.020 0.039* 
  (0.025) (0.022) (0.024) (0.022) 
 MOREFOURP -0.039 -0.042* 0.019 0.019 
  (0.028) (0.025) (0.027) (0.023) 
 NOHOUSEPR -0.101*** -0.059*** -0.108*** -0.096*** 
    (0.019) (0.018) (0.018) (0.015) 
N  12,263 12,263 12,263 12,263 
Wald chi2  889.40 1,652.71 817.00 972.99 
Prob > chi2   0.000 0.000 0.000 0,000 
Notes: Standard errors in parenthesis. Statistical significance at 1% (***), 5% (**), 10% (*). 
Source: Computed by authors based on EC (2007). 
 
Table 4. Estimates on households’ expenditure on household services 
    Electricity Energy Telecomm. 
  Variable Coeff. Coeff. Coeff. 
 Constant term 1.219*** 1.575*** -4.430*** 
    (0.100) (0.094) (0.126) 
Country BELGIUM -0.198*** 0.146*** -0.895*** 
  (0.024) (0.023) (0.031) 
 DENMARK 0.022 -0.059*** -0.155*** 
  (0.021) (0.019) (0.026) 
 ESTONIA -1.327*** -1.359*** 0.189*** 
  (0.045) (0.042) (0.057) 
 FINLAND -0.689*** -0.897*** 0.064** 
  (0.021) (0.020) (0.026) 
 GREECE -0.808*** -0.921*** 0.522*** 
  (0.017) (0.016) (0.021) 
 HUNGARY -0.269*** 0.152*** 0.783*** 
   (0.023) (0.021) (0.029) 
 IRELAND -0.639*** -0.487*** 0.160*** 
  (0.027) (0.025) (0.034) 
 LATVIA -1.430*** -1.266*** 0.098** 
  (0.037) (0.035) (0.047) 
 LITHUANIA -1.225*** -1.114*** 0.032 
  (0.032) (0.030) (0.040) 
 SLOVAKIA -0.816*** -0.508*** -0.219*** 
  (0.029) (0.027) (0.036) 
 SPAIN -0.679*** -0.427*** 0.077*** 
   (0.012) (0.011) (0.015) 
Employment ONEOCUP 0.021* 0.012 -0.049*** 
  (0.011) (0.010) (0.014) 
 NONEOCUP 0.017 0.003 -0.203*** 
    (0.015) (0.014) (0.018) 
Age RP LESS35 -0.150*** -0.152*** 0.101*** 
  (0.013) (0.012) (0.016) 
 RP FROM50TO64 0.125*** 0.125*** 0.109*** 
  (0.011) (0.011) (0.014) 
 RP FROM65TO74 0.140*** 0.166*** 0.090*** 
  (0.016) (0.015) (0.021) 
 RP MORE74 0.122*** 0.178*** 0.071*** 
    (0.018) (0.016) (0.022) 
Education RP EBASIC 0.025** 0.029** -0.175*** 
  (0.012) (0.011) (0.015) 
 RP ESECONDARY 0.025** 0.036*** -0.031** 
    (0.012) (0.011) (0.015) 
Control NMEMBERS 0.456*** 0.431*** 0.604*** 
Variables  (0.010) (0.009) (0.013) 
 NMEMBERS2 -0.030*** -0.028*** -0.041*** 
  (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) 
 NOHOUSEPR -0.316*** -0.268*** -0.001 
  (0.010) (0.009) (0.013) 
 lnSPENDEQ 0.456*** 0.443*** 1.003*** 
    (0.009) (0.009) (0.012) 
N  71,124 71,124 71,124 
F  1,221.66 1,216.69 1,266.59 
Prob > F   0.000 0.000 0,000 
Notes: RP means reference person. Standard errors in parenthesis. Statistical significance at 1% (***), 5% (**), 10% (*). 
Source: computed by authors based on EUROSTAT (2011). 
 
Education.  Consumers with basic levels of education are less satisfied with prices of all 
the services under analysis when compared to consumers with higher education. 
However, the “satisfaction gap” is much larger between consumers with basic education 
and the most educated in the cases of telephone and telecommunications prices (the 
less-educated have a -9.8% and -12.5% probability of being satisfied, respectively), 
whereas for electricity and energy prices, this gap among the less and more educated, is 
-4.2% and -4.3%, respectively. Regarding expenditure, consumers with basic education 
spend slightly more on electricity and energy (+2.5% and +2.9%, respectively) than 
their counterparts, whilst they spend much less on telecommunications (-17.5%). 
Contrasting this data on telecommunications, we observe that the difficulties 
experienced by the less-educated, reflected in markedly lower satisfaction levels, are 
translated into a reduced participation in these markets. As for why this might be so, it 
is possible that market complexity, such as product packages and associated contracts, 
may act as a deterrent for these consumers. On the other hand, less marked, but still 
lower satisfaction levels for energy translate into higher expenditure: intuitively, this 
could be explained by poor decisions taken by these consumers as regards energy-
saving strategies.  
Employment status. Consumers who are not employed are associated with lower 
satisfaction with both telephone and telecommunications prices (-4.5%) and also with 
energy prices (-3.1%), though results obtained considering electricity alone are not 
significant. Turning to RP, households with no employed members spend much less on 
telecommunications (-20.3%) than the category of reference. So, consumers who are not 
employed exhibit particular difficulties in telecommunications markets, reflected in 
their lower satisfaction, which may be leading them to restrict their participation in 
these markets. It is important to note that this creates a vicious circle for this group, 
since they may require fast and reliable telecommunications services in the quest to find 
employment. As for energy, those not employed spend similar amounts to their peers: 
we could surmise that their lower satisfaction could be either an inconsistency or that 
they are paying higher unit cost than their peers, whilst restricting their consumption.  
Age. Consumers over 64 and, particularly, those over 74, express much lower 
satisfaction with the price of the category telephone (-6.1% and -10.9% for these 
groups, respectively): this is sharper still for telecommunications (-11% and -14.7%, 
respectively). As regards expenditure on telecommunications, those between 65 and 74, 
and the over 74s, spend more (respectively, +9% and +7.1%) than consumers between 
the ages of 35 and 49. Higher expenditure, coupled with expressed lower satisfaction, 
suggest that this group of consumers face particular difficulties in these markets and that 
they are taking poorer consumption decisions (for instance, they may be paying a higher 
unit price), when compared with consumers between 35 and 49. To illustrate, it is 
possible that consumers in this category are more likely to demonstrate inertia vis-à-vis 
new telecommunications services, using, for instance, a fixed phone to call a cellular 
one, and may not consider using newer, cheaper communications technologies provided 
through the internet. Interestingly, though the over 65s express less satisfaction than 
consumers between 50 and 64, expenditure by both groups is similar. Either the results 
here are inconsistent, or, they may be because the over 65s take poorer market 
decisions, such as paying more for a more restricted range of services. In the case of 
energy services, age does not appear to influence price satisfaction, so we surmise that 
differences observed in expenditure are due to consumption and lifestyle preferences. 
With respect to other socio-economic characteristics, price satisfaction with 
telecommunications is lower in households with one member. Additionally, price 
satisfaction with both energy and telecommunications services is lower among those 
who do not own their home. Finally, income elasticity is observed to be much lower for 
electricity and energy than for telecommunications. 
The estimations offer other interesting results derived from country differences. 
Isolating the effects of the socio-economic categories, there are greater differences in 
expenditure in energy than on telecommunications. This implies that, whilst the 
differences detected previously as regards consumers’ socio-economic background are 
more important in the telecommunications than in the energy services sector, country 
differences affect expenditure on energy more than on telecommunications. Moreover, 
examining country effects on expenditure and satisfaction, in the case of energy, there is 
no relationship, that is, levels of consumer satisfaction in a given country do not seem to 
be influenced by the relative expenditure in that country in comparison to other 
countries. However, in the case of telecommunications, there is a slight relationship in 
that in countries where expenditure is comparatively lower, satisfaction with price tends 
to be higher. There are several possible explanations for this. One explanation may be 
that progress towards an integrated market in telecommunications has gone further than 
in energy: telecommunications has become a more homogeneous market across Europe 
as regards price and market conditions, whereas energy markets remain fragmented. 
Another possible, and related, reason could be that consumers in general are more 
“savvy” as regards information about telecommunications than energy prices, because 
they have enjoyed a longer period of competition and deregulation in this sector than in 
the energy sector.  
 
6. Conclusions 
 
When policy-makers implemented far-reaching reform of the utilities from the 1980s, a 
key justification was that the introduction of competition, deregulation and privatization 
would inject greater levels of efficiency into these sectors. Consumers would be major 
beneficiaries since they would receive higher quality services, whilst enjoying lower 
prices and greater choice (EC 2004). It followed that consumer satisfaction would 
increase: indeed, many of these reforms were accompanied by the introduction of 
consumer satisfaction surveys, such as the Eurobarometer. However, as survey results 
were analysed, governments, international organizations and regulators increasingly 
recognized that consumer satisfaction was not even. Concern grew that lower consumer 
satisfaction may be associated with particular socio-economic groups, and that not all 
consumers were in an optimum position to benefit from the changes and potential 
benefits opened up by utility reform. At the same time, new thinking on utility reform 
emerged, which argued demand-side approaches could be useful complements to 
traditional supply-side methods. Moreover, increased attention was focused on the 
concept of a potentially vulnerable consumer, understood as a multi-dimensional entity, 
not necessarily addressed adequately by means-testing alone (European Parliament 
2012).  
 
Despite these developments, relatively little empirical analysis had been dedicated to 
establish what precise links may exist between socio-economic characteristics and 
consumer satisfaction. The aim of this paper was to contribute to this knowledge gap by 
analysing this relationship for three household utilities across twelve European 
countries. To do so, SP and RP were contrasted: though combined analysis had been 
applied to other fields, this had not been used to examine consumer satisfaction with 
utilities in multiple countries. Hence, this paper constitutes the first study to do so, using 
EUROSTAT (2011) data and contrasting this with EC (2007). Empirical knowledge on 
this topic could help to avoid concerns over regulator bias, also explained using insights 
from Behavioural Economics (Cooper and Kovavic 2012: 56). We examined three 
major categories which are commonly associated with potentially vulnerable 
consumers: the elderly, those not employed, and those with a basic level of education. 
We found significant results for all three categories. As regards education, we found 
lesser-educated consumers are less satisfied with the prices of all services analysed than 
their counterparts, though the satisfaction gap is much sharper for telecommunications 
than energy. Meanwhile, because the less educated spend relatively more on energy and 
much less on telecommunications than their counterparts, different explanations for 
their lower satisfaction were offered using concepts of poor decision making and 
reduced market participation. Those not employed exhibited slightly lower satisfaction 
as regards energy and telecommunications prices than their counterparts, whilst 
households with no employed members spent much less on telecommunications than 
the category of reference, which may be explained by restricted participation in the 
market, or an under-use of these technologies. One possible explanation is that market 
complexity may be off-putting to this group of consumers. Regarding age, consumers 
over 64 and, particularly, those over 74, express sharply lower satisfaction rates with 
telecommunications than their younger counterparts, whilst they also spend more than 
consumers between 35 and 49. We surmise consumers over 64 may be more likely to 
take poorer quality decisions in this market. Age does not seem to influence price 
satisfaction with energy. 
 
This study is important for several reasons. Insights from Behavioural Economics could 
be mobilized to identify particular socio-economic characteristics of consumers which 
may be associated with potential consumer vulnerability. However, without testing for 
the relationship between particular socio-economic variables and satisfaction in a 
particular market, a regulator is overwhelmed with multiple possibilities potentially 
requiring regulation. The literature on potential consumer vulnerability includes a range 
of variables, including age, education, place of residence, disability, ethnic group and so 
on. Because vulnerability is only “potential”, it does not follow that each variable in 
each market will necessarily need regulatory attention, whilst over-regulation, or 
disproportionate regulation, are undesirable. Hence, it is of interest to test for the 
relevance between different socio-economic variables with satisfaction data, to identify 
whether a relationship exists and, if so, how significant that relationship may be. 
Evidence found in this study could be used to “rank” priorities for regulators when 
considering where to introduce demand-side regulation, as results show satisfaction 
“gaps”, and also, the associated expenditure patterns (more or less than peers). Finally, 
because the publication of household budget surveys and variants of consumer 
satisfaction surveys can be found around the world, this approach to uncovering relative 
priorities for demand-side regulation could be conducted relatively easily at the 
international level, and applied to other fields, most urgently perhaps, financial 
regulation and consumer satisfaction by socio-economic characteristics.  
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Annex 1. Sample size and population of the countries included in the analysis. 
Country Sample size Population size, 
  Eurobarometer EUROSTAT HBS thousands (2006) 
Belgium 1,057 3,550 10,511 
Denmark 1,021 2,447   5,427 
Estonia 1,000 3,432  1,345 
France 1,034            10,240 63,230 
Finland 1,013 4,007   5,256 
Greece 1,000 6,555 11,125 
Hungary 1,002 9,058 10,077 
Ireland 1,000 6,884   4,208 
Latvia 1,002 3,774   2,295 
Lithuania 1,025 7,586   3,403 
Slovakia 1,103 4,710   5,389 
Spain 1,006 8,881 43,758 
TOTAL 12,263 71,124 166,024 
Source: EC (2007) and EUROSTAT (2011). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Annex 2. Estimates from ordered probit models on satisfaction with the price of 
services 
    Energy Telephone Telecomm. 
  Variable Coeff. Coeff. Coeff. 
Country BELGIUM 0.437*** 0.520*** 0.443*** 
  (0.054) (0.053) (0.050) 
 DENMARK 0.079* 0.687*** 0.592*** 
  (0.047) (0.053) (0.051) 
 ESTONIA -0.086* 0.130** -0.076 
  (0.051) (0.052) (0.051) 
 FINLAND -0.847*** 0.100** 0.092** 
  (0.050) (0.047) (0.045) 
 GREECE 0.175*** 0.726*** 0.381*** 
  (0.047) (0.055) (0.048) 
 HUNGARY 0.281*** 0.306*** 0.019 
   (0.057) (0.054) (0.050) 
 IRELAND -0.135** 0.395*** 0.118** 
  (0.052) (0.054) (0.051) 
 LATVIA 0.127** -0.098* -0.317*** 
  (0.052) (0.051) (0.051) 
 LITHUANIA 0.898*** 0.482*** 0.336*** 
  (0.054) (0.053) (0.052) 
 SLOVAKIA 0.765*** 0.566*** 0.089* 
  (0.060) (0.056) (0.050) 
 SPAIN 0.392*** 0.335*** 0.223*** 
   (0.058) (0.059) (0.057) 
Employment NOOCUP -0.081* -0.112** -0.124*** 
    (0.043) (0.044) (0.042) 
Age LESS35 0.026 0.116** 0.192*** 
  (0.050) (0.053) (0.051) 
 FROM50TO64 -0.041 0.007 -0.064 
  (0.055) (0.059) (0.055) 
 FROM65TO74 -0.049 -0.154** -0.328*** 
  (0.073) (0.074) (0.070) 
 MORE74 -0.034 -0.277*** -0.457*** 
    (0.084) (0.080) (0.074) 
Education EBASIC -0.113** -0.248*** -0.361*** 
  (0.052) (0.053) (0.049) 
 ESECONDARY -0.089** -0.061 -0.154*** 
    (0.044) (0.047) (0.044) 
Control ONEPERS -0.044 -0.132*** -0.142*** 
variables  (0.051) (0.050) (0.047) 
 THREEPERS -0.042 0.093 0.138** 
  (0.054) (0.058) (0.055) 
 FOURPERS -0.065 0.049 0.106* 
  (0.059) (0.060) (0.059) 
 MOREFOURP -0.110* 0.047 0.052 
  (0.066) (0.068) (0.064) 
 NOHOUSEPR -0.155*** -0.272*** -0.275*** 
    (0.047) (0.046) (0.044) 
 
Cut 1 
 
-0,611 
(0,065) 
-0,791 
(0,070) 
-1,166 
(0,069) 
 
Cut 2 
 
0,242 
(0,065) 
0,072 
(0,069) 
-0,406 
(0,067) 
 
Cut 3 
 
 
  
0,306 
(0,066) 
Notes: Standard errors in parenthesis. Statistical significance at 1% (***), 5% (**), 10% (*). 
Source: Computed by authors based on EC (2007). 
 
 
Annex 3. Estimates from a binary probit model on satisfaction with the price of the 
service 
    Electricity 
  Variable Coeff. 
Country BELGIUM 0.345*** 
  (0.060) 
 DENMARK 0.530*** 
  (0.064) 
 ESTONIA 0.096 
  (0.062) 
 FINLAND -0.662*** 
  (0.060) 
 GREECE 0.660*** 
  (0.067) 
 HUNGARY 0.092 
   (0.062) 
 IRELAND 0.004 
  (0.061) 
 LATVIA 0.196*** 
  (0.061) 
 LITHUANIA 1,010*** 
  (0.071) 
 SLOVAKIA 0.467*** 
  (0.065) 
 SPAIN 0.252*** 
   (0.063) 
Employment NOOCUP -0.048 
    (0.050) 
Age LESS35 0.024 
  (0.058) 
 FROM50TO64 -0.044 
  (0.064) 
 FROM65TO74 -0.030 
  (0.084) 
 MORE74 -0.062 
    (0.095) 
Education EBASIC -0.117** 
  (0.059) 
 ESECONDARY -0.097* 
    (0.052) 
Control ONEPERS -0.053 
variables  (0.059) 
 THREEPERS -0.065 
  (0.063) 
 FOURPERS -0.164** 
  (0.066) 
 MOREFOURP -0.108 
  (0.076) 
 NOHOUSEPR -0.277*** 
    (0.052) 
 
Cons 
 
0,549*** 
(0,074) 
Notes: Standard errors in parenthesis. Statistical significance at 1% (***), 5% (**), 10% (*). 
Source: Computed by authors based on EC (2007). 
 
 
